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Abstract: 
This publication describes techniques and methods implemented on a computing device, 
directed at detecting latent fingerprint reactivation attacks (e.g., the exploitation of latent 
fingerprints deposited on fingerprint sensors to gain access to computing devices).  In aspects, for 
each fingerprint authentication event, an on-device fingerprint-matching algorithm extracts small 
patches from a fingerprint image (a “Verify Image”) and transforms the patches into rotationally-
invariant vectors.  The fingerprint-matching algorithm then calculates the similarity between the 
vectors of the Verify Image and vectors of a stored, authentic fingerprint (an “Enrolled Image”).  
If the computing device validates the fingerprint (e.g., authorizes the fingerprint and determines it 
is not a latent fingerprint by the steps described below), the computing device permits the user 
access.  The fingerprint image, formerly Verify Image, is now a “Previous Image.”  Finally, the 
fingerprint-matching algorithm merges the vectors from the Enrolled Image and Previous Image 
using a rotation and translation matrix (a “Previous Matrix”).  The computing device temporarily 
stores the Previous Matrix.  
Upon a successive fingerprint authentication event, the algorithm extracts small patches 
from a new Verify Image, transforms the patches into rotationally-invariant vectors, calculates the 
rotation and translation matrix relative to the Enrolled Image (a “Verify Matrix”), and computes 
the similarity between the Previous Matrix and the Verify Matrix.  If the rotation and translation 
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Biometric recognition systems use unique biological characteristics (e.g., voice, retina, 
fingerprint, and the like) to reliably identify and authenticate users.  Of all the available biometric 
recognition systems, fingerprint scanning using optical fingerprint sensors is the most prevalent 
due to its low cost, high efficiency, and relative accuracy.  An optical fingerprint sensor can be 
directly integrated under a display screen of a computing device, and thereby afford seamless 
authentication.  Given these advantages, computing device users often rely on fingerprint scanning 
to secure and access their computing devices.  As with all systems, however, optical fingerprint 
sensors can be tricked, fooled, or spoofed.  One such approach to fool fingerprint scanners involves 
the use of latent fingerprints.  This approach, known as a latent fingerprint reactivation attack, 
attempts to reactivate a computing device through the utilization of a latent fingerprint deposited 
above an optical fingerprint sensor.  In short, latent fingerprint reactivation attacks involve 
unauthorized users exploiting authorized, latent fingerprints deposited above optical fingerprint 
sensors to gain access to computing devices.  Figure 1, below, illustrates a latent fingerprint 
deposited on a computing device directly above an optical fingerprint sensor. 
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As illustrated, the depicted computing device is a smartphone.  Still, other computing 
devices, for example, tablets or watches that utilize optical fingerprint sensors for authentication 
purposes, may also be vulnerable to latent fingerprint reactivation attacks.  The smartphone 
illustrated contains a latent fingerprint deposited directly above an optical fingerprint sensor that 
resides beneath the display cover glass.  As a result, an attacker may attempt to reactivate the 
computing device using this latent fingerprint.   
One approach to thwart reactivation attacks involves the prohibition of identical, 
consecutive fingerprint samples.  While this solution works well for small-area optical fingerprint 
sensors (small-area FPS), large-area optical fingerprint sensors (large-area FPS) may fail to 
identify identical, consecutive fingerprint samples.  Figures 2A and 2B, below, illustrate two 
computing devices: one with a small-area FPS and another with a large-area FPS. 
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     Figure 2A              Figure 2B 
Figure 2A illustrates a smartphone with a small-area FPS, while Figure 2B illustrates a 
smartphone with a large-area FPS.  In both cases, the users authenticated themselves to their 
smartphone using fingerprint scanning.  Both optical fingerprint sensors captured an image of a 
live fingerprint (Previous Image).  In using fingerprint scanning, the users left a latent fingerprint 
on the display cover glass.  Sometime later, an attacker attempts latent fingerprint reactivation 
attacks on both smartphones.  During these attacks, both optical fingerprint sensors captured an 
image of the latent fingerprint (Verify Image).   
Smartphones with a small-area FPS have a fixed capture area; hence, successively reusing 
the latent fingerprint results in identical fingerprint images, as illustrated in Figure 2A.  The optical 
fingerprint sensor captured identical, consecutive fingerprint images (Previous Image and Verify 
Image), and as a result, the smartphone could detect the latent fingerprint reactivation attack.  
Smartphones with a large-area FPS, on the other hand, have a dynamic capture area.  In other 
words, the capture area can shift vertically and/or horizontally, depending on where the peak touch 
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signal is detected.  Hence, reusing a latent fingerprint may result in two different fingerprint 
images, as is illustrated in Figure 2B, where the Previous Image is different from the Verify Image.  
As a result, the smartphone in Figure 2B did not identify a latent fingerprint reactivation attack.   
Since many users rely on large-area optical fingerprint sensors to secure and access their 
computing devices, latent fingerprint reactivation attacks pose serious security and privacy 
concerns.  Therefore, it is desirable to safeguard computing devices from latent fingerprint 
reactivation attacks.  To this end, by generating rotation and translation matrices of a Verify Image 
and a Previous Image both relative to an Enrolled Image, comparing the matrices, computing 




This publication describes techniques and methods implemented on a computing device, 
directed at detecting latent fingerprint reactivation attacks.  For each fingerprint authentication 
event, an optical fingerprint sensor, in a first step, captures a fingerprint image (a “Verify Image”).  
All Verify Images reference a single, 2-dimensional coordinate system.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
referenced coordinate system. 
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Figure 3 
In the next step, a fingerprint-matching algorithm divides each Verify Image into “N” 
number of patches with a sliding distance of one pixel.  The fingerprint-matching algorithm then 
extracts the patches and calculates rotationally-invariant vectors for each of the patches in 
reference to the established coordinate system. 
The fingerprint-matching algorithm extracts rotationally-invariant vectors from each patch 
by including the following: 
● Rotationally invariant Absolute-value Fast Fourier Transforms (AFFTs) of each 
block; 
● The patches’ x-position and y-position — the Cartesian coordinates; 
● The patches’ polar representation of the Cartesian coordinates; and 
● The patches’ Fast Fourier Transforms (FFTs) of the polar representation. 
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The fingerprint-matching algorithm then calculates the similarity between the vectors of 
the Verify Image and vectors of a stored, authentic fingerprint (an “Enrolled Image”).  The 
fingerprint-matching algorithm also outlines the x-coordinate, the y-coordinate, and the angle 
correspondence between the Verify Image blocks and their matching blocks in the Enrolled Image.  
Moreover, the algorithm calculates the translation in the x-direction and y-direction for each Verify 
Image block.  Finally, the fingerprint-matching algorithm merges the vectors from the Verify 
Image and the Enrolled Image using a rotation and translation matrix. 
If the computing device validates the fingerprint, it permits the user access and temporarily 
stores the rotation and translation matrix (a “Previous Matrix”) of the Verify Image, now referred 
to as a Previous Image.  The Previous Matrix may be temporarily stored on-device until replaced 
by a successive rotation and translation matrix of a new Previous Image.  Further, a user may be 
provided with controls allowing the user to make an election as to both if and when systems, 
programs, and/or features described herein may enable the collection and storage of a Previous 
Matrix.  The computing device can be configured to only use the information after the computing 
device receives explicit permission from the user of the computing device to use the data.   
Upon a successive fingerprint authentication event, the algorithm again extracts small 
patches from a Verify Image, transforms the patches into rotationally-invariant vectors, calculates 
the similarity between the vectors of the Verify Image and the vectors of the Enrolled Image, and 
merges the Verify Image vectors and the Enrolled Image vectors using a rotation and translation 
matrix (a “Verify Matrix”).  The algorithm then compares the Verify Matrix to the Previous 
Matrix.  If the matrices are identical, then a latent fingerprint reactivation attack can be identified.   
Take, for instance, a user (John) and his smartphone.  John authenticates himself to his 
smartphone using fingerprint scanning and, in so doing, deposits a latent fingerprint on the display 
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cover glass.  John’s smartphone authenticates his fingerprint by means of a fingerprint-matching 
algorithm, which both validates his fingerprint (e.g., verifies the fingerprint matches the enrolled 
fingerprint) and confirms that his fingerprint is not a latent fingerprint.  Finally, the fingerprint-
matching algorithm temporarily stores the rotation and translation matrix of his fingerprint image.  
John, soon after, turns off his smartphone, sets it down, and walks away.  An unauthorized user 
then grabs the phone and attempts a latent fingerprint reactivation attack.  Figure 4 illustrates 
John’s smartphone and the latent fingerprint.  
 
Figure 4 
As illustrated, the smartphone contains a large-area fingerprint sensor.  The first capture 
area (Area 1) was the capture area where the computing device first captured an image of John’s 
fingerprint (Previous Image).  The fingerprint-matching algorithm calculated a Previous Matrix 
for the Previous Image relative to an Enrolled Image.  The smartphone stored this Previous Matrix.   
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The second capture area (Area 2) was the capture area where the computing device 
captured the newest fingerprint image (Verify Image).  The smartphone captured the Verify Image 
during an authentication event initiated by an unauthorized user attempting a latent fingerprint 
reactivation attack.  In response to the authentication event, the fingerprint-matching algorithm 
calculates a Verify Matrix for the Verify Image relative to the Enrolled Image and compares it to 
the Previous Matrix.  The fingerprint-matching algorithm identifies identical rotation and 
translation matrices, and as a result, rejects the attacker access. 
Advantages of such an approach to identify latent fingerprint reactivation attacks include 
identifying latent fingerprints with minimal power and latency since, for example, latent 
fingerprint detection can operate simultaneously to fingerprint validation events.  Additionally, the 
algorithm only needs to calculate a few rotationally-invariant vectors to determine the similitude 
of the rotation matrices before rejecting the latent fingerprint.  Finally, the fingerprint-matching 
algorithm can compare Verify Images to more than one Previous Image in an effort to ensure no 
latent fingerprint enables access to the device, regardless of when the latent fingerprint was 
deposited on the display glass. 
In addition to the above descriptions, during a no-intent authentication event, the 
fingerprint-matching algorithm can operate in low-power mode to capture fingerprint images, 
extract blocks, transform the blocks to rotationally-invariant vectors, calculate a Previous Matrix 
for the fingerprint image relative to the Enrolled Image, and temporarily store the rotation and 
translation matrix.  A no-intent authentication event may occur when users handle their device 
with no intent to access their device and yet deposit latent fingerprints on the display glass.  For 
example, when a user grabs their phone off a table or from their pocket.  Therefore, regardless of 
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when or how a latent fingerprint was deposited on the display cover glass, the fingerprint-matching 
algorithm can protect the computing device from latent fingerprint reactivation attacks. 
Further still, an anti-latent detection algorithm (e.g., a machine-learned model) can be 
employed to identify latent fingerprints.  Employing this anti-latent detection algorithm in 
combination with the fingerprint-matching algorithm provides a two-level security scheme by 
which latent fingerprints can be identified and rejected. 
In summary, this publication describes techniques and methods implemented on a 
computing device, directed at detecting latent fingerprint reactivation attacks.  In aspects, for each 
fingerprint authentication event, an on-device fingerprint-matching algorithm extracts small 
patches from a Verify Image and transforms the patches into rotationally-invariant vectors.  The 
fingerprint-matching algorithm then calculates the similarity between the vectors of the Verify 
Image and vectors of the Enrolled Image.  If the computing device validates the fingerprint, then 
the computing device permits access to the user.  The fingerprint image, formerly Verify Image, 
is now a Previous Image.  Finally, the fingerprint-matching algorithm merges the vectors from the 
Enrolled Image and Previous Image, generating a Previous Matrix.  The computing device 
temporarily stores the Previous Matrix.  
Upon a successive fingerprint authentication event, the algorithm extracts small patches 
from a new Verify Image, transforms the patches into rotationally-invariant vectors, calculates a 
Verify Matrix relative to the Enrolled Image, and computes the similarity between the Previous 
Matrix and the Verify Matrix.  If the rotation and translation matrices are identical, then the 
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